As courts grapple with balancing individual rights and public order, the imposition of bail conditions has become a contentious battleground in the legal landscape. Recent rulings highlight a troubling trend where bail conditions may undermine the very principles they are meant to uphold. In July 2024, a groundbreaking Supreme Court (“SC”) ruling in Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau (“Frank Vitus”) redefined the boundaries of bail conditions, emphasizing the protection of constitutional rights. Just months later, on October 15, 2024, the Madhya Pradesh High Court (“HC”) faced a similar challenge in Faizal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (“Faizal”), where the accused was charged with inciting enmity through divisive slogans. The court granted bail, but the conditions imposed raised serious questions about their legality and fairness. This case presents a timely opportunity to explore how recent legal precedents are being applied—and potentially misapplied—in the evolving landscape of bail jurisprudence.
Though bail was granted by the court, the validity of the bail conditions is explored in this essay. First, the rules for construing bail conditions are extracted by drawing on Frank Vitus. Second, the validity of the conditions imposed in Faizal is examined, with the argument being made that they gloss over the law established in Frank Vitus. Given the constitutional foundation underlying the imposition of bail conditions, it is concluded that an error was made by the court in Faizal in its imposition of bail conditions.
Frank On Bail Conditions
In Frank Vitus, the appellant was a foreign national. He was being prosecuted under §§8, 22, 23, and 29 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS”). This includes offences such as importing psychotropic substances into India, conspiring for the same, etc. He was granted bail, but subject to a number of conditions by the Special Judge, NDPS. Two conditions are relevant for the present discussion:
i. That the High Commission of Nigeria must show that the accused will not leave the country, appear before the Special Judge as and when required, and was willing to grant a certificate for the same. The HC had prescribed this as a condition while relying on the decision in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India & Ors. (1994).
ii. That accused must drop a pin on Google Maps with his current location.
It was precisely these conditions that were challenged in Frank Vitus. The court noted that bail conditions were not governed by any special laws. Even though the accused had allegedly committed offences under NDPS, a special enactment, the court was clear in holding that bail conditions are (currently) exclusively within the ambit of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”) (Frank Vitus, ¶4). §439 of the CrPC (now §482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita or BNSS) provides for the same. These provide that the HC/Court of Sessions can impose such conditions as provided for in §437(3) of the CrPC/§480(3) of the BNSS. These provisions align mutatis mutandis across both codes and may be reproduced as follows:
“(a)that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter,
(b) that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected, and
(c) that such person shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence, and may also impose, in the interests of justice, such other conditions as it considers necessary.”
Apart from these, the SC noted that the court can also impose conditions “in the interest of justice.” (¶5) This implies that any condition imposed must be in furtherance of the administration of justice—bail conditions cannot be “arbitrary, fanciful, or freakish.” (¶7) The purpose of imposition of bail conditions is to ensure a free and fair investigation as well as trial (¶7). The court also asserted that bail conditions find their grounding in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and the constitutional rights of the accused must be circumscribed to the minimum extent possible (¶7). For instance, while a bail condition may be to “cooperate with an investigation,” this cannot be taken to mean that the accused is required to confess as to his guilt, as this contravenes his right against self-incrimination under Article 21 (¶7.1).
Much work has already delved into the holding in Frank Vitus, such as with respect to the electronic monitoring condition, more generally on its holding, etc. Hence, it will be trite to spend more time on the same. For the purposes of this paper, essentially, the holding of the court as to what bail conditions ought to look like can be distilled as follows:
First, the conditions must not be onerous. The SC noted that bail conditions cannot be so onerous as to defeat the purpose of bail. For instance, keeping a constant vigil on the accused violates his right to privacy, and defeats the purpose of granting bail (ensuring his liberty) by effectively confining him in a different form, though there is no physical incarceration. However, prohibiting the accused from entering the locality in which key witnesses reside is permissible, as it is necessary to prevent witness tampering (¶7.1). In other words, Frank Vitus reflects a concern for proportionality, arguing against arbitrariness in the imposition of bail conditions.
Second, bail conditions cannot be impossible to fulfill for the accused, as it defeats the very purpose of bail if his bail is cancelled for reasons outside his control (¶9). Herein, the SC noted that requiring the accused to acquire a certificate from the High Commission of Nigeria stating that he was not a flight risk was impossible for him to fulfill, as he had no control over the commission’s decision to grant the certificate or not (¶12).
Third, the conditions have to relate to the administration of justice, that is, furtherance of the trial process (¶5). The purpose of imposition of conditions must be reflected in the bail condition (¶5). In this case, the SC observed that dropping a PIN on Google Maps shared only the accused’s current location, and not his live location. This could be of no value to the police, as it did not enable real time tracking and hence was unconnected to the administration of justice (¶10.1). Regardless, the SC held real time tracking as being violative of the accused’s right to privacy under Article 21 (¶10.2).
It may be noted that these are not overlapping grounds. However, any bail condition must meet all 3 conditions – proportionality, feasibility, and consistency with administration of justice. Building on this framework established in Frank Vitus, the following section evaluates the HC’s approach in Faizal, highlighting the stark contrasts and potential misapplications of legal principles.
Faizal In Light Of Frank Vitus
In Faizal, the Madhya Pradesh HC’s decision to grant bail was accompanied by controversial conditions aimed at fostering a sense of national pride in the accused. Here, in light of the crime alleged (promoting enmity and prejudicing national integration by chanting “Pakistan Jindabad Hindustan Murdabad”), the HC sought to impose conditions that would “enthuse in him the sense of responsibility and a pride for the country in which he is born and living.” (Faizal, ¶5). Hence, they imposed a condition that he must visit a police station twice a month (on the 1st and 4th Tuesday of every month), and chant “Bharat Mata ki Jai” 21 times while saluting the national flag (¶6).
The problematic bail condition in this case is undoubtedly the requirement for the accused to chant “Bharat Mata ki Jai” 21 times while saluting the national flag. This condition clearly violates two key principles established in Frank Vitus—proportionality and relevance to the administration of justice. Such a requirement far exceeds what is necessary to ensure the accused’s presence at trial or maintain order in judicial proceedings. It is arbitrary and coercive, forcing the accused into a specific action that has no direct connection to the trial process.
Moreover, this condition does not aim to prevent flight risk, ensure witness non-interference, or secure the accused’s attendance in court, which are the legitimate purposes of bail conditions. The SC in Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2012) held that bail conditions should solely serve the purpose of ensuring the accused’s presence during the trial and must not be punitive. In the present case, the imposed condition leans more towards punishment than any practical need for securing the accused’s attendance, making it entirely disconnected from the purpose of bail. As a result, the condition fails to meet the principles of proportionality and relevance to the administration of justice, propounded in Frank Vitus. Therefore, the order should be withdrawn to the extent that it imposes this particular bail condition.
Trend of Bizarre Bail Conditions
This HC order aligns with a troubling trend of courts across the country imposing bizarre and unrelated bail conditions. These include directives like donating to Gurushala, serving cows for a month, distributing copies of the Quran, or purchasing non-Chinese LED TVs. Similarly, in another case, the court required the accused to plant saplings (in addition to donating to the PM CARES Fund), presenting it as a symbolic act of reformation. The rationale was that such a condition could address the root causes of violent behavior by promoting a deeper moral and philosophical transformation in individuals, rather than merely imposing punishment. This mirrors the court’s approach in Faizal, where it aimed to instill a sense of responsibility and pride in one’s country through the bail conditions imposed.
However, this raises concerns about the appropriateness and legality of such “creative” but arbitrary bail conditions, completely unrelated to their main object, that is administration of justice. While many of these orders have been withdrawn or overturned, the trend remains concerning. It reflects a troubling instinct within the judiciary to regulate the personal actions of accused individuals in ways that are unrelated to the administration of justice. This shift towards imposing arbitrary conditions on bail risks straying from the core legal principles of ensuring fairness, proportionality, and justice in legal proceedings.
Conclusion
The evolving landscape of bail jurisprudence, as exemplified by the SC’s ruling in Frank Vitus and the Madhya Pradesh HC’s decision in Faizal, underscores a critical tension. While Frank Vitus laid down essential principles governing bail conditions—emphasizing proportionality, feasibility, and alignment with the administration of justice—Faizal illustrates a concerning departure from these tenets. The imposition of conditions that veer into ideological territory not only risks violating individual rights but also threatens the foundational integrity of the legal system. Given these troubling trends, it is imperative for the judiciary to re-evaluate the criteria for imposing bail conditions. A return to principles of fairness, proportionality, and respect for individual rights is essential to ensure that the justice system serves its intended purpose—upholding the rule of law and protecting the rights of all individuals. Bail conditions should serve their intended purpose: ensuring the accused’s presence at trial and protecting the integrity of the judicial process.
The Authors are 2nd year students of National Law School of India University, Bangalore
Constitutional Law Society 
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