Part I of this blog series covered close overlap between the Classification Doctrine and the Non-Arbitrariness Doctrine, whilst Part II shall critique the ‘rationality’ standard underpinning both doctrines and analyze the Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine, examining how it allows for a deeper judicial scrutiny of both the purposes and effects of legislation
‘Rationality’ as Review: The Deficiency in Article 14’s Twin Doctrines
As a result of the close overlap between the Classification and the Non-Arbitrariness Doctrine, courts have often constructed a link between ‘equality’, ‘non-arbitrariness’ and the concepts of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘rationality’ (¶21). This section highlights the differences between a thin ‘rationality’ requirement and a more demanding ‘reasonableness’ review.
At a philosophical level, ‘rationality’ review is best understood as a formal, and process-oriented standard. It is concerned with the formal correctness and efficiency of the State action (the ‘means’) in achieving the proclaimed State interest (the ‘ends’), and the internal logical coherence of decision-making (pg. 133). This standard is deferential to the legislature and executive, operating as a floor, not a ceiling, for legality. Courts applying this standard often rely on a test of relevancy, i.e. determining whether the factors considered by the State fall within a legally permissible set (pg. 184). Courts may assess whether a consideration aligns with the statutory language, purpose and context, and thereby classify it as a mandatory relevant, permissible relevant, or irrelevant factor. A failure to consider a mandatory factor, or the inclusion of an irrelevant one, renders the action unlawful, regardless of whether the ends themselves are normatively justified.
Reasonableness, on the other hand, is a substantive and normative standard. It permits deeper judicial engagement with the justification of ends, requiring them to be consistent “with fair terms of cooperation’ and mindful of their broader impact on individuals and groups.” It scrutinizes not just the presence of relevant considerations, but the weight and balance assigned to them (pg. 133). Courts may thus ask: Is the legislative objective itself fair, just, and consistent with constitutional values? Are the means proportionate and not unduly burdensome on affected individuals or groups? Reasonableness requires courts to evaluate the quality of the justification offered by the State, not just its internal logic.
The two-pronged Classification Doctrine, which is informed by the Non-Arbitrariness Doctrine, continues to function as little more than a rationality assessment. Courts often rely on negative formulations like “not irrelevant” or “cannot be said to be irrational” to justify the impugned classification:
“The classification cannot be said to be irrational or illegal or unconnected with the scheme and purpose of the Act or Part IX of the Constitution.” (Rajbala v State of Haryana ¶85)
This suggests a highly deferential standard requiring only a rational nexus between classification and objective. Courts rarely evaluate whether the objective itself is normatively justified, nor do they assess how the law actually impacts different individuals or groups on the ground. Even the Non-Arbitrariness Doctrine requires that the state interest only be “legitimate” and “relevant” for an act to be lawful (¶85).
Therefore, both the Classification Doctrine and the Non-Arbitrariness Doctrine remain ultimately constrained by their shared reliance on a narrow rationality standard. It is in this context that we must now look at the new Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine.
Manifest Arbitrariness: Greater Scope for A ‘Reasonableness Review’
In Shayara Bano v Union of India, J. Nariman traced the longstanding debate on whether non-arbitrariness alone could justify striking down entire statutes (¶88-¶101), and ultimately affirmed the Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine as a basis for invalidating plenary legislation. It was formulated as follows – “something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle”.
Though semantically close to Non-Arbitrariness, Manifest Arbitrariness diverges in its application in two ways: first, it also applies to plenary legislation, whereas, the former being limited to executive action and delegated legislation; and second, as this section contends, Manifest Arbitrariness permits a broader standard of judicial review as compared to its counterpart. This breadth, however, is also what lends the doctrine its inherent vagueness.
Vasu Agarwal observes that Manifest Arbitrariness operates as a standard rather than a rule, i.e. its content is not fixed at the time of promulgation but is instead developed ex-post at the stage of adjudication. This is because the potential circumstances in which the doctrine may be invoked are innumerable, making it impractical to define its contours ex-ante. Building on this insight, this section contends that such vagueness is not a defect but a feature of the doctrine. To understand this claim better, it is essential to examine how the Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine has been invoked and applied by courts. I indicate two such applications of the test in two different contexts.
In Navtej Johar v Union of India, the Supreme Court relied on Manifest Arbitrariness to strike down §377 of the Indian Penal Code. Notably, the Court’s reasoning reflected elements of an ‘indirect discrimination’ or ‘disparate impact’ analysis, suggesting a shift toward a more effects-based and substantive approach under Article 14.
“The presence of this Section in its present form has resulted in a distasteful and objectionable collateral effect whereby even ‘consensual acts’, which are neither harmful to children nor women and are performed by a certain class of people (LGBTs) owing to some inherent characteristics defined by their identity and individuality, have been woefully targeted. It fails to make a distinction between consensual and non-consensual sexual acts between competent adults. Further, Section 377 IPC fails to take into account that consensual sexual acts between adults in private spaces are neither harmful nor contagious to the society. This being the case, Section 377 IPC, so long as it criminalises consensual sexual acts of whatever nature between competent adults, is manifestly arbitrary.” (¶252-¶254)
The above reasoning evidently relies on an assessment of the law’s discriminatory effect, emphasizing that §377 disproportionately criminalized and stigmatized individuals based on immutable characteristics. Therefore, §377 was “manifestly arbitrary” not because it was independently irrational per se, but instead because one, its failure to accommodate relevant distinctions, such as consent and harm, and two, its ‘disparate’ impact on a specific group by enforcing conformity to majoritarian norms. This focus on effect rather than just purpose is the hallmark of substantive reasonableness. A similar analysis was also carried out in the Delhi High Court case of Harsh Mander v UoI, where provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1949 were held to be Manifestly Arbitrary because it had a disproportionate impact on the homeless, a vulnerable class (¶65-¶68).
In in Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, J. Pardiwala’s dissenting opinion illustrates how the Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine can absorb ‘temporality’ as a dimension of unreasonableness. While the majority upheld the provision, Pardiwala J struck it down, innovatively invoking what he termed the “doctrine of temporal unreasonableness” (Pardiwala J. ¶177).
“§6A(3) of the Citizenship Act was never meant to maintain the status quo regarding the immigrants of the 1966-71 stream. It was enacted with the object of achieving en-masse deletion of this category of immigrants from the electoral rolls subsequent to which de-jure citizenship was to be conferred on them after a cooling-off period of ten years.” (Pardiwala J. ¶141)
Therefore, courts are not just expected to accept the State’s proclaimed objective (“ostensible” purpose) at face value. Instead, they must critically examine the law’s text, structure, and its actual operation, in order to uncover the “real” purpose behind it (¶194). This method signals a shift away from the formal, deferential assessments of legislative intent toward a more searching, substantive scrutiny of legislative justifications.
The second innovation in Pardiwala J’s dissenting opinion is the dicta that “temporal unreasonableness is a facet of Manifest Arbitrariness”.
“The open-ended nature of Section 6A has, with the passage time, become more prone to abuse due to the advent of forged documents to establish the, wrong date of entry into Assam, inaccurate lineage, falsified government records created by corrupt officials etc…..in the absence of any temporal limit to its application, the efflux of time is rather counter-serving the object with which it was enacted….thereby rendering it Manifestly Arbitrary.” (Pardiwala J. ¶165-¶174)
This temporal dimension, i.e. how a law’s continued existence may itself become arbitrary, marks a distinct departure from traditional Article 14 frameworks. Neither the Classification Doctrine nor the Non-Arbitrariness Doctrine possesses the conceptual tools to account for such an evolution. Both treat the moment of enactment as determinative of constitutionality, unless a later amendment occurs. This explains Justice Pardiwala’s deliberate use of the Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine to strike down §6A, thereby expanding the scope of an Article 14 analysis to address ‘temporal unreasonableness’.
Conclusion
This blog has traced the evolution of judicial review under Article 14 from the rigid confines of the Classification Doctrine and the Non-Arbitrariness Doctrine to the more expansive terrain opened up by the Doctrine of Manifest Arbitrariness.
Both of the above two cases demonstrate the broader point of this article: that the Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine opens the door to a substantive ‘reasonableness’ review allowing courts to look beyond the surface of legislative classification, or the mere presence of a rational nexus, and to ask whether a law, in its real effects, actual operation, and present justification, is consistent with logic and the Constitution. While Navtej Johar and in Re: Section 6A represent two specific applications of the Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine, through ‘disparate impact’ and ‘temporal unreasonableness’ respectively, they are by no means exhaustive of its potential reach. The flexible and standard-like nature of the doctrine allows it to accommodate a wide array of constitutional harms that may fall outside the narrow confines of traditional Article 14 analysis.
The Author is a 3rd-year student of National Law School of India University, Bengaluru.
Image Credit: NDTV
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