National Law University Odisha
This piece examines the Patna High Court decision in Youth for Equality v. State of Bihar. It argues against the Court's pronouncement of the Bihar state's legislature's competence to carry out a census and challenges the the manner in which the Court arrived at its decision.
This blog analyses the characterizstion of arbitrariness as an enemy to equality, contending that while the Classification Doctrine and the older Non-Arbitrariness Doctrine both operate primarily as formal, process-based rationality requirements, focused on the means-end connection, the Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine introduces a more normative, effects-based evaluation of both ends and means.
This blog analyses the characterizstion of arbitrariness as an enemy to equality, contending that while the Classification Doctrine and the older Non-Arbitrariness Doctrine both operate primarily as formal, process-based rationality requirements, focused on the means-end connection, the Manifest Arbitrariness Doctrine introduces a more normative, effects-based evaluation of both ends and means.
The institution of marriage and the acts committed between a husband and a wife witnesses a dilution of the public-private divide. The article focuses on the offence of marital rape in the light of such divide by analysing the split verdict the Delhi High Court delivered in the case of RIT Foundation v. Union of India.
The Supreme Court in Balaji Raghavan upheld National Awards’ validity, ruling they aren’t “titles” under Article 18(1). However, applying the proportionality test reveals flaws – opaque selection risks bias, undermining equality. Reforms for transparency and inclusivity are needed to align awards with the Constitution’s egalitarian ethos.
This blog critically examines the sub-categorisation of Scheduled Castes in India, highlighting its role in redefining equity and ensuring fairer distribution of affirmative action benefits. While it promises to empower the most marginalised, it also raises concerns about reinforcing caste divisions and political motivations behind such policy shifts.
The concept of intersectionality continues to elude judges. While the concept has been applied in a few Supreme Court judgements such as Patan Jamal Valli and Navtej Johar, it is still not easy to understand ‘how’ courts should apply intersectionality. In this article, the Author focuses on the M. Sameeha Barvin v Joint Secretary case from the Madras High Court that throws light on intersectionality. The Author argues that the case acts as an instructive manual on how courts can apply intersectionality in matters of discrimination.
Till date, marital rape is not considered a crime in India. Through the article, the Author aims to explain why the judiciary needs to urgently intervene and declare marital rape as unconstitutional. Taking the marital status of the perpetrator and the victim as a defence, the consent of a woman to sexual intercourse has been repeatedly de-prioritised by various High Courts in recent times. Further, the Author analyses some cases to show how consent cannot be easily detected, but a look into the totality of the circumstances helps determine the same. Lastly, the Author provides suggestions for dealing with marital rape as an offence.
The Supreme Court gave a landmark decision in the Delhi water crisis case. The Author attempts to decode certain aspects of the judgement, focusing on its directive to release Yamuna river water amid acute scarcity in the capital. It examines the legal intricacies surrounding the Court's jurisdiction, the implications for water management, and the dynamics of inter-state water disputes. Central to the discussion is the debate over whether the Court's intervention signifies judicial activism or exceeds its constitutional mandate. By analyzing these complexities, the Article underscores the judiciary's role in ensuring equitable outcomes and protecting fundamental rights in critical public interest matters.
The article delves into the contentious issue of case transfer and clubbing within the Indian judicial system, highlighting concerns of impartiality and procedural fairness. Justice Hilary Charlesworth underscores the need to eliminate non-legal considerations influencing judgments, echoing international human rights standards. Divergent judgments and discretionary powers raise alarms of potential violations of Article 21 of India’s Constitution and ICCPR Article 14. Drawing insights from international jurisprudence, the article advocates for well-defined criteria to govern case consolidation, ensuring judicial economy and alignment of interests. Upholding procedural fairness is imperative to mitigate arbitrariness and uphold human rights standards in India’s legal landscape.
The discourse over the Uniform Civil Code (hereinafter UCC) was rekindled post its inclusion in the manifesto of BJP for 2019, andhas intensified as we near the 2024 elections. The long-awaited dream of realizing the UCC seems to be in touching distance now, which was once subjected to much clamor and contestation in the Constituent Assembly (CA). The judicial and political environment is more favorable presently than ever before. The article is written with the twin motive to explain why the UCC has remained unenforced for so long; and the need for enforcing it today, while looking at the contemporary successful examples of UCC
The recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra & Ors has lately been in news due to its upcoming hearing before a 7-judge-bench. Subhash was set in the context of the political controversy regarding the intra-party dissent and subsequent alleged defections that took place within the Shiv Sena Legislative Party in Maharashtra. This article critically analyses the position propounded in Subhash regarding the reference of Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly to a larger bench. Ultimately, this article argues that there are several inconsistencies present in the application of the reasons specified for referring Nabam to a larger bench. Further, it contends that the interim measure proposed in Subhash is unconstitutional in nature and thus, should be set aside.
Constitutional Law Society 