Law Commission Findings: A Longstanding Demand for Rational Court Fees
The demand for reform with respect to court fees is not new, and has received continuous attention from the Law Commission of India for over the last six decades. The commission has repeatedly addressed the issue across nine reports, from its 14th Report (August 1958) through the 189th Report (September 2004). These reports have repeatedly urged that the cost for the citizen for accessing the courts must not stand in their way for procuring essential rights and freedoms– i.e., justice cannot come at such a price that makes it economically unobtainable.
The need for the same was formally acknowledgment for the first time in the 14th Law Commission Report on the Reform of Judicial Administration (1958). The report concluded with a clear rejection of the idea of using court fees as a deterrent against frivolous litigation. The commission firmly stood on the opinion that the administration of justice is a sovereign function of the State and the idea that citizens will have to pay for it was fundamentally inconsistent with a society governed by the rule of law. The Commission stated:
“It is one of the primary duties of the State to provide the machinery for the administration of justice and on principle it is not proper for the State to charge fees from suitors in courts.”[iii]
The idea was reaffirmed decades later in the 128th report on Cost of Litigation (1988)[iv] where the commission criticised the then prevailing tendency of increasing court fees under the guise of fiscal necessity. The commission made a precise statement noting that, the high court fees was detrimental to the victims with legitimate claims – particularly those who happened to be poor, while failing to be used as a deterrent against vexatious claims. Remarkably, the report went so far as to say:
“However, the Law Commission would be extremely happy if the State Governments or the Government of India, as the case may be, view the court fees as something incompatible with a society governed by rule of law and would, therefore, like to abolish it.”[v]
This bold statement implies that reforms to court fees would matter as part of extending our constitutional morality and accompanying dimensions of socio-economic equity.
The 189th Law Commission Report (2004) contains the most extensive solution of this issue as this report presents access to justice as a fundamental human right, and ultimately criticizes the use of court fees as a tool for revenue generation. The Commission proposes that funds for the Court should come from general taxation, aligning with the approach in the UK and Australia, where the justice system is seen as a public good.[vi]
To address inequality, the 189th Report proposes states to have uniform caps on court fees, a national model law, and periodic revisions only for fixed fees (not ad valorem fees, which is variable with value of the subject matter of the suit). It also suggests that concerns about frivolous litigation should be addressed through exemplary costs imposed by courts, not by creating prohibitive entry fees.[vii] Further, it makes an essential recommendation for an independent judicial body to investigate court fee structures and notes the need for co-ordinated action by the Centre and States to achieve equity in access.
Recommendations & Way Forward
There is a necessity for court fees to be uniform not merely for administrative convenience rather it is a constitutional obligation. First, the Union Government ought to consider establishing a Model Court Fees Code under the Concurrent List, to provide states with a framework and guidelines while promoting federal integrity. The model law should include requirements for progressive fee slabs and upper limits so that no litigant may be excluded from accessing justice.
A Judicial Equalisation Fund should be considered to help economically disadvantaged states develop judicial infrastructures without over-reliance on exorbitant court fees. This would reduce the need for states to extract revenue from justice.
Secondly, a court fees rationalisation commission, autonomous from the executive, ought to be established to review and update fee structures on a periodic basis to ensure adjustment for inflation, and to rationalise fees between different regions. Court fees must be means-tested, providing full waivers or reductions for socially deprived groups, such as women, SC/ST, seniors, persons with disabilities, and bona fide public interest litigants.
Finally, court fees payable for e-filing or remote hearings ought to have nominal or waived fees to encourage increased access to technology, especially in rural populations, etc. Moreover, in countries like Singapore, a sound system where fee is determined by the time undertaken to dispose off the case rather than the commercial value is more equitable.
Lastly, access to court fees ought to be included within the legal aid schemes to close the divide between entitlement and access. Until so is possible, ensconcing the right to access justice in India will not be truly just or affordable.
Conclusion
The argument for reforms is compelling. Once a useful regulatory mechanism to deter vexatious litigation, court fees now act as a barrier to justice for the poor, infringing on both constitutional obligations and human rights standards. From the Law Commission through various courts’ pronouncements to statistics, the message is coming together: access to justice cannot be discriminatory. The time has come for courtrooms to prioritize justice before revenue. The absence of implementation reflects not just a lack of legal foresight but a failure of political will and fiscal prioritization. These concerns are not merely academic. High Courts, including the Kerala and Guwahati High Courts, have echoed the Supreme Court’s warning against pricing litigants out of the justice system, recognising that disproportionate court-fee regimes risk defeating the constitutional promise of equal access to justice.
[iii] Law Commission of India, 14th Report (1958), Vol. I, Ch. 22, para 42.
[iv] Law Commission of India, 128th Report (1988).
[v] Law Commission of India, 189th Report (2004), citing 128th Report (1988), para 4.6.
[vi] Law Commission of India, 189th Report on Revision of Court Fee Structure, para 5.1, 2004.
[vii] Ibid, paras 4.6, 6.3, 8.1.
The author is a final year student of the Dharmashastra National Law University, Jabalpur.
Image Credits: Tingey Injury Law Firm, USA
Constitutional Law Society 
Leave a comment