Legal Limits to FDI as Delegated Legislation Under the Draft FEM Rules 2026

Shubhankar Palash Bora and Meghaj Choudhury


On 21 July 2026, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released the draft Foreign Exchange Management (Foreign Investment) Rules 2026 (Draft Rules), proposing a replacement for the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules 2019 (NDI Rules). Among the changes proposed is that Rule 4 of the Draft Rules formally vests the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) with the power to interpret India’s foreign investment policy, including sectoral caps and entry routes by way of updating Annexure II of the Draft Rules. The caps reproduced in Annexure-II, incorporate the Consolidated FDI Policy “as amended from time to time”, however these changes are to be only referenced rather than reproduced. Thus, future changes to sectoral caps may be capable of taking effect without an amendment to the principal Rules under the Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (FEMA). This piece argues that referencing, rather than scheduling, sectoral caps in Annexure-II transfers an essential legislative function to executive discretion without the checks FEMA otherwise requires and proposes concrete measures for how that power should be constrained and exercised.

What Has Actually Changed

Under the NDI Rules, the boundary between “law” and “policy” was already porous as evidenced by the land-border investment restriction introduced through Press Note 3 (2020 Series) which took nearly six years to be codified in Rule 6(a) through the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) (Amendment) Rules 2026, operating in the meantime as executive policy rather than notified subordinate legislation.

Rule 4 draws upon the distinct powers already conferred by FEMA 1999 under sections 46 (rule-making power of the Central government) and 47 (RBI’s power to make regulations) to clarify that the power to interpret the foreign investment policy itself, and to issue directions on it, vests in DPIIT alone as a matter of executive discretion over policy. Sectoral caps, entry routes and sectoral conditions, placed within Annexure-II, are described in the Draft Rules as the foreign investment policy “issued by the Government of India, as amended from time to time” and are expressly referenced rather than reproduced in the Rules. Thus, an investment cap can change without the change ever being processed as a rule under Section 46 of FEMA, which empowers the Central Government to make rules to give effect to the Act, or laid before both Houses of Parliament as required by section 48. The RBI’s stated rationale, set out in its press release accompanying the Draft Rules, is that separating procedural provisions from policy improves regulatory coherence and allows the FDI policy be updated without a full rule-making cycle.

The Limits of Delegated Legislation

Indian administrative law distinguishes between the impermissible delegation of “essential legislative functions” and the permissible delegation of “conditional legislation” which is involving the filling in of the details once legislature has the laid down policy. The locus classicus remains the Supreme Court’s seven-judge Special Reference in In re The Delhi Laws Act 1912, which held that a legislature may not abdicate its policy-making function to the executive, even while permitting delegation of administrative details.

Furthermore, a sectoral cap is not a technical detail incidental to a settled policy; it is the policy, since it decides how much of a sector foreign capital may own. Housing that decision in Annexure-II, amendable by DPIIT through press note alone, arguably transfers this essential legislative function to the executive. Another key concern is that no imperatives, goals or standards have been prescribed to be followed by the DPIIT in exercising its power which the court held to be impermissible in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, by striking down the executive power delegation as “uncanalised and uncontrolled” precisely because of the lack of any limitations on the exercise of discretion. Similarly, Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab, illustrates this concern, as the Court upheld a delegation fixing a sales tax rate not exceeding two per cent but struck down an open-ended rate-fixing power elsewhere for want of a ceiling. That distinction, which is discretion bounded by a stated maximum versus discretion left open, applies directly to Annexure-II, which fixes no outer limit that DPIIT cannot cross through a press note.

Another concern relates to the doctrine of “legislation by reference,” addressed by the Supreme Court in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra. The Constitution Bench observed that where a law refers to another, later amendments to the source “would normally become applicable,” but that this “is always a question of construction” governed by the object and scheme of the referring law. In Girnar, both instruments were statutes, so every imported amendment had passed through a legislature. Annexure-II, by contrast, imports DPIIT’s press notes, which are neither notified nor laid before Parliament. Since FEMA’s scheme requires rules to be made under Section 46 and laid under Section 48, a reference that lets caps change outside both defeats that scheme rather than serving it.

Lastly, in Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd, the Supreme Court characterized price fixation under the Essential Commodities Act 1955, as an essentially legislative function not attracting natural justice. An analogous argument could be made for FDI caps since they are economic instruments which might best be left to executive flexibility, and that courts should extend the same deference here. However, Cynamide was concerned with the character of a decision for natural-justice purposes, not with whether the decision-making power was validly located outside the rule-making process. These are two different questions, and insulation from natural-justice review says nothing about whether the underlying power was validly delegated or exercised in the first place.

The Risks of Unfenced Discretion and How Comparator Regimes Answer Them

Section II’s concern is not that DPIIT possesses discretion, but that Annexure-II supplies no ceiling on it, no fixed date of change, and no institutional audience before which that change is answerable, which is precisely the defect that Devi Das Gopal Krishnan condemned in a provision taxing “at such rates as it may deem fit.” Comparator regimes confirm that each of these three risks is separately curable, even where none eliminates all three at once.

The first risk of an unbounded standard, is cured in Australia, where the Treasurer decides whether a transaction is contrary to the “national interest” under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth). Sections 22 and 25 also address the second risk of traceability by imposing a 30-day statutory examination window, extendable by 90 days, after which any order must be gazetted.

The United Kingdom’s National Security and Investment Act 2021 answers the third risk, of institutional audience, directly: its “call-in” power carries Section 61‘s mandatory annual report laid before each House of Parliament.

Finally, in the United States,  section 721(e) bars judicial review only of the President’s ultimate action to block a transaction and the findings underlying it, a narrow carve-out and not a blanket immunity for the CFIUS process. Everything upstream of that finding is bound, which includes reviews and investigations to be run on fixed 30- and 45-day statutory clocks, and the chairperson must certify notices to named congressional leadership after each review and file an annual report to Congress by 31 July. CFIUS therefore already answers two of the three risks Section II identifies, namely, a bounded standard and an institutional audience, through the statute itself, reserving unreview ability for the single, final, presidential act. Even that narrow immunity did not go unqualified in Ralls Corp v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which required notice of the factual basis for a divestment order and a meaningful opportunity to respond before it could bind.

Synthesis and Recommendations

The regimes surveyed above differ sharply in how a cap or threshold acquires legal effect, and that difference is the crux of the concern this piece raises. In Australia, the numerical thresholds that actually trigger mandatory notification sit in the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulation 2015 (Cth) which is a legislative instrument subject to the legislature, while the “national interest” guidance that informs the Treasurer’s ultimate judgment sits in a separate Policy document that, as Treasury itself acknowledges, has no force of law.

The United Kingdom goes further still as the seventeen notifiable sectors are fixed by a Statutory Instrument subject to affirmative parliamentary resolution. The United States locates its triggers in 31 C.F.R. Part 800, amendable only through notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. In each case, the instrument that actually binds a transaction is a legal one, open to disallowance, affirmative approval, or rulemaking challenge, and not a policy document. Annexure-II inverts this hierarchy, as the binding cap sits in the policy layer, and the legal layer merely gestures at it.

Five specific changes would close that gap without disturbing DPIIT’s substantive policy role:

  1. Convert Annexure-II into a scheduled legal instrument. Sectoral caps and entry routes should sit in a Schedule to the Rules, or a separately notified Regulation under Section 46.
  2. Fix an outer ceiling on any single amendment. Rule 4 should fix a maximum permissible departure per change (a defined percentage-point band), echoing the bounded delegation the Supreme Court upheld in the case of Devi Das Gopal Krishnan.
  3. Impose a fixed gazettal window. Every Annexure-II amendment should appear in the Gazette within a stated number of days of DPIIT’s decision, mirroring the ten-day publication window Australia’s FATA imposes on the Treasurer’s orders.
  4. Extend Section 48 on a post-facto track. Material Annexure-II amendments should be laid before each House of Parliament under a procedure modelled on Section 48’s thirty-day modification window, letting Parliament annul or modify a change after the fact.
  5. Publish a reasoned note with every material change. DPIIT should accompany each Annexure-II revision with a short-published rationale, modelled on the UK’s Section 61 report, so the standard guiding “interpretation” is recorded and testable against later challenge.

None of this requires abandoning the efficiency case the RBI has made for separating procedure from policy. What it requires is refusing to let that efficiency be purchased silently, at the expense of safeguards such as a bounded standard, a traceable date, and an institutional audience that every comparator regime supplies at least one of. Until the Draft Rules supply an analogous anchor, DPIIT’s policy power will remain broader, and less checked, than any of its foreign counterparts.


The authors are third year students of the Gujarat National Law University.


Image Credits: Unsplash

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